ECB Foreign Exchange Intervention and the Euro: Institutional Framework, News and Intervention. by Rasmus Fatum & Michael M. Hutchison
EPRU






Tel: (+45) 3532 4411
Fax: (+45) 3532 4444
E-mail: Grethe.Mark@econ.ku.dk
Homepage: http://www.econ.ku.dk/epru/
ECB Foreign Exchange Intervention and






The activities of EPRU are financed by a grant from





ECB Foreign Exchange Intervention and the EURO: 










Rasmus  Fatum       Michael  M.  Hutchison* 
Department of Marketing, Business       Department of Economics 
Economics  and  Law      Social  Sciences  1 
University of Alberta School of Business    University of California 
Edmonton, Alberta          Santa Cruz, CA 95064 USA 
Canada  T6G  2R6      email:  hutch@cats.ucsc.edu 
email: rasmus.fatum@ualberta.ca      Abstract       
Using a unique intervention “news” data set, this paper investigates the impact of 
ECB intervention and intervention-related “news” (newswire reports) on the euro 
exchange rate. A time-series study of “news” generated by ECB officials and market 
participants regarding intervention and the value of the euro as well as an event study of 
firm reports of ECB intervention is conducted. Both studies find significant short-run 
effects on the euro value, while only “negative” statements (official statements denying 
past intervention or ruling out future intervention) appear to have persistent effects. 
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2The weakness of the external value of the euro since its inception in January 1999 has 
been a source of concern among policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic. European 
Central Bank (ECB) officials have made numerous statements attempting to support the 
euro, pointing to such factors as growth potential, “fundamentals”, as well as the 
possibility of (coordinated) central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market. 
Confronted with particularly strong downward pressure on the euro in fall 2000, the 
European Central Bank (ECB) took direct action and intervened four times in the foreign 
exchange market, buying euros against dollars, in an attempt to support the currency.   
There is no consensus, however, on whether intervention is effective in moving 
exchange rates or, in particular, whether ECB efforts to support the euro were successful. 
Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of sterilized intervention is mixed, attributable in 
part to the different methodologies employed in empirical studies of intervention, 
different exchange rate markets, different time-periods as well as fundamentally different 
types of intervention data. It is not clear how ECB intervention or, for that matter, rumors 
of intervention and other relevant intervention news affect the euro. How the market 
responds to intervention “news” is particularly ambiguous since the ECB is a new 
institution, with an independent status and an overriding aim of price stability. 
Although empirical research often finds limited or no evidence in favor of a 
consistent link between sterilized intervention and associated movements of exchange 
rates, some research seems to point towards intervention as being “sometimes” or 
“occasionally” effective in moving exchange rates
1. Recent studies reconcile these 
seemingly contradictory findings by suggesting that central banks may at times possess 
private information about future fundamentals and target values of foreign currencies. 
Accordingly, intervention might reveal such information and, depending on the 
prevailing market sentiment, influence market expectations and affect current exchange 
3rates.
2 This “information signaling channel hypothesis” can be seen as nesting the 
“classical” signaling channel, through which sterilized intervention is effective in 
providing new information about monetary policy intentions and, if credible, information 
about future fundamentals.
3 Further, the observation that intervention is occasionally 
successful may be consistent with the noise trader channel (Hung, 1997). That is, central 
bank interventions may work in the presence of so-called “chartists”, where positive 
feedback traders may support a bandwagon movement initially started by central bank 
intervention.  
  Empirical studies that are not confined to testing a specific channel through 
which intervention affects exchange rates are usually more supportive of its effectiveness. 
Within the literature using the profitability of intervention as one (perhaps controversial) 
measure of success, Sweeney (2000) finds that the Fed made, at times, substantial and 
significant risk-adjusted profits. Using an event study methodology, Fatum and 
Hutchison (2002) find evidence that intervention affects the exchange rate in the short 
run. Their findings are broadly consistent with the related work of Catte, Galli and 
Rebecchini (1994) and the time-series based study of Dominguez and Frankel (1993).  
Although the ECB has only intervened in the exchange market on four occasions 
in late 2000, the financial press (newswire reports) has picked up numerous rumors of 
intervention, official statements expressing views regarding the value of the Euro as well 
as statements by the ECB on the usefulness of intervention. In this context, the objective 
of this paper is to broadly investigate ECB intervention-- the institutional context, the 
effects of rumors and official statements regarding intervention on daily euro exchange 
rate movements, and the impact on the markets from the cases where euro-support 
intervention was confirmed.  
4The main contributions of the paper consist of empirical analyses of a unique 
intervention “news” data set on daily USD/EUR rate movements and an event study on 
firm reports of ECB intervention. The first analysis is based on time-series study of 
“news” generated by ECB officials and market participants regarding intervention and 
the value of the euro. We separate newswire reports into four categories—including 
official statements, market rumors and firm reports of intervention-- and measure what 
type of news has systematically moved the exchange rate. We also undertake a detailed 
case study, using an event-study methodology, on the four occurrences of euro 
intervention acknowledged by the ECB. Consistent with the findings of Frenkel, 
Pierdzioch and Stadtman (2001), both analyses provide some support for the short-run 
efficacy of ECB intervention operations in support of the euro, but the effects are not 
long lasting. Interestingly, we find that “negative” statements by ECB officials 
questioning the efficacy of intervention, denying past intervention, and ruling out future 
intervention, have systematically depreciated the euro and the effect appears persistent.   
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the 
institutional framework within which ECB foreign exchange market intervention policy 
is formulated. Section 2 presents the empirical work linking USD/EUR exchange rate 
changes to “news” (newswire reports) relating to intervention and official statements 
about the euro. Section 3 presents the event study methodology applied to the USD/EUR 
intervention. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
 
1  Institutional Framework and Intervention Policy in the EU 
Since the inception of the Euro on January 1, 1999, the ECB intervened in the USD/EUR 
exchange market on only four occasions, all in late 2000: September 22, November 3, 
5November 6 and November 9. The September 22 intervention was undertaken together 
with other central banks and was immediately acknowledged in an official ECB press 
release. The ECB did not release details over the magnitude of intervention, but the 
Federal Reserve purchased 1.5 billion euros against the dollar on that date and noted that 
it was coordinated with the ECB and the monetary authorities of Japan, Canada, and the 
United Kingdom (Federal Reserve Bulletin, December 2000; p. 813). The early 
November interventions were not immediately acknowledged by the ECB (although press 
reports were widespread) and the operations were noted in the 2000 ECB Annual Report 
(p. 54).   
  The legal structure of the ECB provides it with great independence with the 
overriding objective of price stability in the Euro area (see, for example, Gros and 
Thygesen, 1998)
4. This primary objective has been emphasized numerous times by ECB 
President Duisenberg (see, for example, speech on the occasion of the 2000 Spruce 
Meadows Round Table in Calgary, September 8, 2000) other officials of the ECB, and 
given support by national leaders in Europe. The EUR/USD exchange rate, in terms of 
the formulation of ECB policy, is mainly relegated to the role as an indicator variable (the 
“second pillar” of monetary policy; see, for example, ECB Monthly Bulletin, November 
2000) for inflation.
5   
  The ECB also has a great deal of discretion over intervention policy. Article 2 
(“Objectives and Tasks of the ESCB”) of the Constitution of the European System of 
Central Banks states that “…the primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price 
stability” and that, without prejudice to price stability, it shall support the general 
economic policies of the EU. Foreign exchange market intervention policy is addressed 
under “External Operations” (Article 23) where it is noted that the ECB and national 
central banks may: 
6 
•  establish relations with central banks and financial institutions in other 
countries and, where appropriate, with international organizations;  
•  acquire and sell spot and forward all types of foreign exchange assets and 
precious metals; the term foreign exchange asset' shall include securities 
and all other assets in the currency of any country or units of account and 
in whatever form held;  
•  hold and manage the assets referred to in this Article;  
•  conduct all types of banking transactions in relations with third countries 
and international organizations, including borrowing and lending 
operations. 
 
Formally, the Governing Council of the ECB (comprising the members of the 
ECB Executive Board and the governors of the national central banks) decides on 
intervention operations by a simple majority vote, where each member has one vote (in 
accordance with Article 10.1 and 10.2). In practice, of course, there is consultation 
between the ECB and other EU institutions and foreign government officials. The 
coordinated intervention operation on September 22, for example, followed a meeting on 
September 8-9 of the euro-group ministers (finance ministers of EU countries 
participating in EMU) in Versailles where support for a strong rather than stable euro was 
a key element in the official meeting statement.  
 
2  News and the Euro 
Applying the efficient markets hypothesis to foreign exchange, a large literature has 
investigated the impact of “news” on exchange rate changes. The basic idea is that 
“news”, by definition, must be unanticipated information—and this information, in turn, 
might have value in revising expectations over current or future exchange rate 
fundamentals. Early studies linking press reports (“news”) .and exchange rate movements 
7include Engel and Frankel (1984) and Ito and Roley (1987). A recent study investigating 
daily news reports on macroeconomic conditions (e.g. unemployment conditions, 
industrial production reports, consumer prices) and the Euro exchange rate is Galati and 
Ho (2001). They find that “bad” macroeconomic news tends to depreciate the euro but 
that “good” macroeconomic news is not similarly incorporated into euro appreciation.   
No study to date, however, has investigated whether news reports of official 
statements, rumors of intervention and the like have had an impact on the value of the 
Euro exchange rate. Even though the ECB has only officially announced one intervention 
operation on the day same day it occurred (on September 22, 2000) and only on one 
occasion subsequently acknowledged a previous intervention episode (intervention in 
early November, acknowledged in the ECB Annual Report 2000), the financial press 
have reported numerous rumors of intervention, official statements expressing views 
regarding the value of the Euro as well as statements on the usefulness of intervention. 
For example, on April 20
th (Thursday) and 21
st  (Friday) of 2000 ECB officials 
stated that the ECB was not planning on intervening in the foreign exchange market 
(reported in WSJ on the following Friday and Monday, April 21 and 24, respectively), 
despite recent weakness of the euro. The euro dropped more than 3% over the subsequent 
3 business days. 
Our objective is to investigate whether statements and rumors of this nature 
reported in the press, either favorable or unfavorable to the Euro, are systematically 
related to USD/EUR exchange rate changes. Four types of news reports are extracted 
from the financial press and dated to the point they were reported over the newswires. 
The Wall Street Journal was searched in detail over the January 1, 1999 to February 8, 
2002 period for every report mentioning ECB, Euro and/or (foreign exchange market) 
8intervention. From this large sample, relevant news reports were separated into four 
categories:  
 
•  A: Rumors and speculation of Euro support intervention by the ECB or other 
central banks;  
•  B: Statements by officials in support of the Euro (including suggestions that 
intervention is a possibility); 
•  C: Statements by officials not supportive of the Euro (e.g. denying rumors that 
intervention has occurred or is likely); 
•  D: Firm reports of intervention (i.e. four dates in fall 2000); 
 
 
In our sample, there are 36 occurrences of category A news reports, 16 
occurrences of category B news reports, 26 occurrences of category C news reports, and 
4 occurrences of category D news reports. The complete listing of these news reports is 
available from the authors upon request. 
To the extent that the categories A to D represent “news”, we would expect 
categories A, B and D to be associated with an appreciation of the Euro and category C to 
be associated with a depreciation of the Euro.  
  We test these hypotheses within the following framework: 
 
(1)   t t t t X L S L S ε γ β α + + ∆ + = ∆ − ) ( ln ) ( ln 1       
 
where ∆lnS is the change in the natural logarithm of the USD/EUR exchange rate (daily 
noon quote in New York), and X is the vector of contemporaneous and lagged “news” 
variables A-D. (Lags are incorporated in order to capture the dynamic response of the 
exchange rate to the arrival of news). The equations are estimated over the sample period 
91 January 1999 to February 8, 2002 (751 business day observations) with daily data using 
the White correction for heteroskedasticity. 
  The results from estimating equation (1) are reported in Table 1. The first column 
reports the baseline model. The second column reports results from estimating a dynamic 
model where the contemporaneous value and four lags of each of the focus variables are 
included (A, B, C and D). (Only the sum of the lagged coefficients on each of the focus 
variables is reported for brevity). The third column combines the favorable news 
variables (A, B and D) into a single (0, 1) dummy variable, to evaluate whether positive 
news generally is incorporated into the market value of the euro. 
In the baseline model, shown in column 1, two of the focus variables (A and C) 
are statistically significant at the 95% level of confidence (or higher) and of the expected 
signs. Rumors of ECB intervention in support of the euro (variable A) are associated with 
an immediate 0.24 percent appreciation of the euro. Statements by ECB officials in 
support of the euro or implying the use of intervention to support the euro (variable B) 
are not statistically significant (and not of the expected sign). By contrast, statements by 
ECB officials not supportive of the euro, such as denying rumors that intervention has 
occurred (or is likely to occur) and questioning the efficacy of intervention (variable C), 
are statistically significant and associated with an immediate 0.47 depreciation of the 
euro. Firm reports of ECB intervention in support of the euro (variable D) are associated 
with an immediate 0.66 percent appreciation of the euro but are not significant.  
The model estimates reported in column 2 (the dynamic model) show similar 
impact effects (contemporaneous values), but now firm reports of ECB intervention are 
significant and associated with euro appreciation. The table shows the sum of the 
contemporaneous and lagged values (termed the “dynamic effect”) for each of the focus 
variables. The F-statistics testing the hypothesis that this sum is equal to zero, and that 
10the individual values are jointly (contemporaneous and lagged values) equal to zero, are 
also reported. These dynamic effects measure whether the effect of news announcements 
persist for a full week (5 business days).  Consistent with the results from the baseline 
model, the strongest and most persistent effect is associated with unfavorable news. No 
persistent effects are found for the other news variables.  
The model estimates reported in column 3, using the combined measure of 
favorable news (ABD), again finds that unfavorable news (variable C) immediately 
depreciates the euro (with the same magnitude and significance level as in column 1). 
The combined measure of favorable news is positive and significant at just under the 90 
percent level of confidence.  
On balance, our results indicate that official statements denying ECB 
intervention (past, present or future) or the efficacy of intervention (variable C) have 
apparently been viewed as important “news” and worked to depreciate the value of the 
euro. This effect is persistent over a week at least
6. Rumors and speculation of 
intervention in support of the euro (variable A) is associated with euro appreciation, but 
the effect is not persistent. By contrast, the market apparently ignored official statements 
in support of the euro (variable B). There is some evidence that firm reports of euro-
support intervention (variable D) had an impact—the few instances of these reports, 
however, occurring on only 4 out of 751 business days, may explain why stronger 
support for the efficacy of official intervention was not found. This is the motivation for 
the event study of the next section.  
 
3  An Event Study Methodology Applied to Euro Intervention 
The foundation of an event study is the definition of the event of interest and the 
identification of the period over which – in this context - the exchange rate movements 
11are examined. This period is referred to as the event window and it is comprised of the 
pre-event days (sometimes referred to as the estimation window), the event day (or days), 
and the post-event days.
7 
A general consideration when defining events is that, if the event period is set too 
short, then what is actually one policy episode of intervention may be incorrectly 
identified as two (or more) events (and potentially leading to a number of overlapping 
event windows). On the other hand, if the event period is set too long, then what are 
actually two policy episodes – separate policy decisions to intervene in the foreign 
exchange market – may be incorrectly identified as a single event. 
Following Fatum and Hutchison (2002) we define an event as a period of days 
with official intervention in the USD/EUR exchange rate market in one direction (in 
terms of purchases or sales), conducted by the ECB, the Fed, or both, and possibly 
including five consecutive days of no intervention.  
We apply three criteria to determine or define what characterizes a successful 
event. The first criterion is simply based on whether the direction of the subsequent 
exchange rate movement is the same as the direction in which the central bank was 
intervening, e.g. does the value of the euro relative to the dollar increase after euros are 
purchased? The second criterion defines a successful event as one where intervention is 
associated with a smoothing of the exchange rate movement, i.e. an event is deemed 
successful if it is either successful according to the direction criterion or the subsequent 
exchange rate movement is smaller (“smoother”) than the exchange rate movement 
preceding the central bank intervention. Our third criterion distinguishes between 
“leaning with the wind” and “leaning against the wind” events by conditioning each 
event on the exchange rate movement of the associated pre-event window. This measure 
is denoted the “reversal” criteria. 
12In order to test if an observed number of successes is statistically significant, 
Fatum and Hutchison (2002) employ the non-parametric sign test for the median as well 
as a matched sample test for the “smoothing” criterion. Since there are only four firm 
reports of intervention in the euro, i.e. only four data points are available within the 
context of our daily data analysis, we are unable to perform any formal statistical tests 
regarding effectiveness. However, the event study methodology can still be applied and 
gives a more rigorous foundation for a case study approach. It allows for a thorough 
characterization of whether or not the events of intervention in the USD/EUR exchange 
rate appear successful or not. 
Applying the event study methodology to the firm reports of euro intervention 
(variable D), two separate events emerge – a one-day event on September 22 and a 3-day 
event spanning from November 3 through 9 (both events in 2000). Table 2 shows the 
exchange rate movements around the two events for the associated pre- and post-event 
windows for window lengths of 2, 5, 10 and 15 days.  
The first part of the case study of euro intervention focuses on the intervention 
policy of the central banks. With respect to the intervention policy pursued by the central 
banks participating in the first event, it is not surprising that for the longer window 
lengths it appears consistent with a “leaning against the wind” intervention policy, given 
the history of a sustained downward trend in the value of the euro vis-à-vis the dollar. 
However, it is interesting to notice that based on the shortest window length, the 2-day 
window, the intervention policy is described as “leaning with the wind”, thereby lending 
some anecdotal support to the view that central banks prefer to intervene “with” the 
market in the short run even if the purpose of intervention is to break or “lean against” a 
long run trend.
8 
13The second event of euro intervention appears consistent with a “leaning with the 
wind” policy when looking at the 2, 5 and 10-day pre-event windows, while consistent 
with a “leaning against the wind” policy when looking at the 15-day pre-event window.
9 
Again, with reference to the sustained euro depreciation since its inception in January 
1999, this suggests a central bank that is timing its intervention operations such that it 
intervenes “with” the market in the short run. 
The second part of the euro intervention study employs the previously defined 
criteria – “direction”, “reversal”, and “smoothing” – in order to evaluate the 
successfulness of the two events.
10 The evaluation of successfulness is summarized in 
table 3. Focusing on the first event, it appears successful according to all three criteria 
(when applicable) when the analysis is based on the shorter window lengths. When the 
analysis is based on the longer window lengths, the September 22 event appears 
unsuccessful with respect to maintaining an exchange rate level effect (the “direction” 
and the “reversal” criteria), while it remains successful with respect to the “smoothing” 
criterion. Although the analysis of intra-event exchange rate movements is beyond the 
scope of the applied event study methodology, it is worthwhile pointing out that the spike 
in the value of the euro on the day of the September 22 intervention was transitory. In 
fact, 16 business days after the first event of euro intervention, the exchange rate had 
reverted to a level below its level on September 21, the day immediately preceding the 
event. This observation further emphasizes that the effects of intervention appear short-
term.
11 
Turning to the second event (which is classified as a “leaning with the wind” 
event with respect to all but the 15-day window length, thus only the “direction” criterion 
is meaningful for the analysis based on the 2, 5, and 10-day windows) a similar pattern 
prevails, i.e. the November 3 through 9 event appears successful when the analysis is 
14based on the shorter window lengths. When the analysis is based on the 10-day window, 
the event appears unsuccessful. With respect to the 15-day window length, however, this 
event appears successful according to all three criteria.  
Rather than concluding that the second event was associated with lasting level as 
well as smoothing effects on the exchange rate, it seems likely that the explanation lies 
elsewhere. The event study methodology implicitly assumes that intervention defines the 
event and the exchange rate movements during the pre- and post-event windows are 
unrelated to other economic news. In this case, the longer the window length, the more 
likely it seems that what drives the euro appreciation is the turmoil surrounding the US 
presidential election counts and recounts in Florida and the widespread selling of dollar 
assets in anticipation of a prolonged gridlock. 
4   Conclusion 
This paper makes two main contributions. The first contribution is a time-series analysis 
of “news” generated by ECB officials and market participants regarding intervention and 
the value of the euro. We find that either official statements denying ECB intervention 
(past, present or future) or questioning the efficacy of intervention have apparently been 
viewed as important “news” and worked to depreciate the value of the euro. This effect is 
persistent over a week at least. The contrary is not the case, however: the market 
apparently ignored official statements in support of the euro. Firm reports of intervention, 
as well as rumors and speculation of intervention in support of the euro, are associated 
with short-term euro appreciation. 
The second contribution is a detailed case study, using an event study 
methodological approach, on the effects of the four confirmed cases of ECB intervention. 
Based on all three alternative criteria of success, the first event (September 22, 2000) 
15appears successful when the analysis is based on relatively short window lengths. 
However, the results are mixed when longer window lengths are considered. A similar 
pattern emerges in the analysis of the second event (three occurrences of intervention in 
November 2000).  
On balance, both methodological approaches support the view that ECB 
intervention has been successful in the short run. Interestingly, only “negative” 
statements by ECB officials (questioning the efficacy of intervention and denying that 
they have intervened or will intervene) appear to both immediately depreciate the euro 
value and have a persistent effect.  
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1 See Sarno and Taylor (2001) for a recent survey. 
 
2 See, for example, Baillie, Humpage and Osterberg (2000) and Humpage (1999). 
3 See Fatum and Hutchison (1999) for a direct test of the “classical” signaling channel. 
The theoretical justification offered by the “portfolio balance” channel, through which 
sterilized intervention changes the currency denomination of relative asset supplies and 
thereby the exchange risk premium if assets are imperfect substitutes, has received little 
empirical support (see, for example, Edison (1993)). 
4 In terms of independence of instructions from government bodies, for example, the 
ECSB statute states: “…neither the ECB nor a national central bank nor any member of 
their decision-making bodies shall seek or take instructions from Community institutions 
or bodies, from any government or a member state or from any other body.” (Article 7). 
As Gros and Thygesen (1998) point out, this wording supporting independence of 
instructions is more explicit than even the Bundesbank.   
5 However, the official press release associated with the September 22 coordinated 
intervention operation didn’t mention Euro zone price stability, stating only: “On the 
initiative of the European Central Bank, the monetary authorities of the United States and 
17Japan joined with the European Central Bank in concerted intervention in exchange 
markets because of their shared concern about the potential implications of recent 
movements in the euro exchange rate for the world economy.” (ECB Press Release, 
September 22, 2000). 
6 The evidence that “bad” news has a strong and more persistent effect on the market is 
consistent with the results of Galati and Ho (2001) relating to macroeconomic news. 
7 See MacKinlay (1997) for a survey on event study methodology. 
8 Given that the market may have expected coordinated intervention and statements in 
support of the euro on the following day at the G7 Meeting, another explanation for the 
exact timing of the Sep. 22 event is that the central banks wanted to surprise the foreign 
exchange market (keeping in mind that no previous intervention in the USD/EUR 
exchange rate had been carried out). 
9 The 15-day pre-event window associated with the second event overlaps with the 15-
day post-event window associated with the first event, thus the characterization of the 
intervention policy for the second event based on the 15-day window length is only 
indicative.   
10 If the exchange rate change during the associated pre-event window is an appreciation, 
i.e. the event appears consistent with a “leaning with the wind” policy, the “reversal” and 
“smoothing” criteria are not meaningful and the evaluation of successfulness not 
applicable. 
11 See Fatum (2000) for an overview of intra-event DEM/USD exchange rate movements 
during the post-Plaza period. 
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Table 1  Intervention News and Exchange Rate Changes 
(a) 































A, B or D  0.155
(1.56)
1  Dynamic effect of A  0.116
F-test for week-long effect 
F-test for joint significance 
0.33
0.64
2  Dynamic effect of B  0.565
F-test for week-long effect 
F-test for joint significance 
2.23
1.07
3  Dynamic effect of C  -0.666
F-test for week-long effect 
F-test for joint significance 
6.08***
2.78**
4  Dynamic effect of D  0.523
F-test for week-long effect 
F-test for joint significance 
0.81
1.17
Observations  751 749 751
R
2  0.03 0.05 0.02
Durbin-Watson stat  1.96 1.95 1.95
a) OLS regressions corrected for heteroskedasticity (using White’s standard errors). Standard 
errors in parentheses; *** denotes significance at the 99% level, ** denotes significance at the 
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a)  Average daily percentage change in the EUR/USD exchange rate over the two, five, ten 
and fifteen business days, respectively, prior to first day of the event. 
b)  Official data regarding the magnitude of ECB intervention operations is unavailable. 
Estimates found in the financial press suggest that central banks bought euros in the 
amount of 6 billion dollar on September 22 and that the ECB subsequently bought euros 
in a total amount of 3 billion dollar during the early November event. 
c)  Average daily percentage change in the EUR/USD exchange rate over the two, five, ten 













Successfulness of Intervention in the EUR/USD Exchange Rate Market 
 
 






     
Event Sep 22, 2000 
  2-day  YES   N.A.   N.A. 
  5-day  YES YES YES 
10-day  NO NO  YES 
15-day  NO NO  YES 
     
Event Nov 3, 2000 – Nov 9, 2000 
  2-day  YES   N.A.   N.A. 
  5-day  YES   N.A.   N.A. 
10-day  NO   N.A.   N.A. 
15-day  YES YES YES 
 
a)  Intervention is successful if the purchase of euro is associated with a subsequent 
appreciation of the euro. 
b) Intervention is successful if the purchase of euro is associated with a subsequent 
appreciation of the euro. If the exchange rate change during the associated pre-event 
window is an appreciation of the euro, i.e. the intervention policy appears as “leaning 
with the wind” for the given window length, this criterion is not meaningful and the 
evaluation of successfulness is denoted n.a.
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